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The last two decades, alternative trading systems have been competing with traditional exchanges.
Our paper focuses on one such system, a crossing network (CN). We present an overview of the theo-
retical and empirical literature on CNs. Also, we review our own contribution, which presents a
dynamic model of the interaction between a dealer market and a CN. We discuss the set-up of the
model, our main findings and empirical predictions.
I. Introduction
Over the past two decades, new technolo-
gies as well as deregulatory forces have
been leading to the development of alter-
native trading systems (ATS). These ATS
now compete for order flow with tradi-
tional markets (for recent reviews see e.g.
Degryse and Van Achter (2002),
Dubreuille and Gillet (2004) or Ludwig
(2004)). Our paper focuses on one partic-
ular type of ATS, i.e. crossing networks
(CNs). These are defined by the SEC
(1998) as “systems that allow participants
to enter unpriced orders to buy and sell
securities, these orders are crossed at a
specified time1 at a price derived from
another market”. Examples of CNs are
Instinet Crossing Network, POSIT, E-
Crossnet, or Xetra XXL. Data from POSIT
show that in 2004 each trading day on
average 21.8 million shares were crossed.
About 50% stems from stocks in the S&P
500, almost two third from stocks in the
Russell 1000. Moreover, a recent survey
ordered by E-Crossnet shows that volume
sent to crossing networks is set to rise
significantly as traders expect to increase
their use of crossing networks by 90
percent, on average, over the next two
years2. As can be gauged from the SEC-
definition, CNs do not contribute to price
discovery as they typically use the
midprice3 of an existing primary market as
their transaction price. Each CN uses a
proprietary algorithm for matching buy
and sell orders. These specific rules are
often opaque. All CNs aim at maximizing
trading volume or the value of matched
orders. For example, Xetra XXL, a
crossing network for block trades at Deut-
sche Börse, implements a volume/time
priority rule. We continue the paper by
first highlighting theoretical work
concerning the microstructure of CNs.
Then, we turn to empirical work on CNs.
The last section contains some concluding
remarks.
II. Theory about CNs
Theoretical work modelling the CNs
market microstructure is a recent area of
research. We first review two static models
of CNs: Hendershott and Mendelson
(2000), the seminal paper in this field, and
Dönges and Heinemann (2001). Next, we
discuss our own contribution, which
presents a dynamic model, see Degryse,
Van Achter and Wuyts (2004). Due to the
specific nature of CNs (i.e. no price
discovery, no market impact), the analysis
differs from earlier studies on the competi-
1. To avoid price manipulation, the midprice is selected at a random time within a 5- or 7-minute interval immediately
following the scheduled cross time.
2. See www.itginc.com/products/posit/ and www.ecrossnet.com for more information.
3. In some cases, however, also the preceding closing price or the volume-weighted average price over some period may be
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tion between financial markets (e.g. Pagano (1989),
Chowdry and Nanda (1991), Glosten (1994), Parlour and
Seppi (2003)).
A. Static Models of CNs
Hendershott and Mendelson (2000) model intermarket
competition between a CN and a Dealer Market (DM).
Their aim is to investigate the tradeoff between the bene-
fits of increasing competition between markets and the
potential costs of order flow fragmentation due to the
introduction of CNs4. They show that the effects of CNs
on market performance and investor welfare are subtle
and complex. In their model, a random number of
informed and liquidity traders simultaneously decide to
submit single-unit orders to one of both markets. This
choice depends on trader specific characteristics, such as
their valuation and impatience to trade, as well as on
market parameters (submission and execution costs at the
CN, dealer’s half spread, CN’s probability of execution).
Each trader determines his best response given his expec-
tation of all other traders’ strategies. Four possible strate-
gies arise: (i) not trading, (ii) exclusive CN trading, (iii)
exclusive DM trading and (iv) opportunistic CN trading.
The latter reflects the possibility to relay orders to the DM
upon non-execution at the CN.
Hendershott and Mendelson show that different trading
mechanisms may coexist. This happens when the popula-
tion of traders is heterogeneous, for instance in the degree
of impatience to trade. Each market caters to the needs of
particular classes of investors, resulting in order flow frag-
mentation5. DMs are influenced in two opposite ways by
competition from the CN. On the one hand, there is risk
sharing as dealers’ inventory and adverse selection costs
are lowered by exclusive CN traders6, resulting in lower
spreads. On the other hand, opportunistic CN trading
(this means using the DM as “market of last resort”) may
widen the spread. In this case, the CN is skimming off part
of the uninformed traders. Consequently, this fraction of
uninformed traders cannot be “used” anymore by dealers
to compensate their losses to informed traders. Within the
CN, also two opposite forces are at work. First, a positive
liquidity externality exists, as an increase in CN trading
volume benefits all CN traders and attracts additional
liquidity7. Second, when the CN becomes sufficiently
liquid, this liquidity externality may be dominated by a
negative crowding externality: low-liquidity preference
traders compete with the higher-liquidity preference
traders on the same market side. Consequently, increasing
CN order flow eventually may even reduce overall
welfare. Combined with the competition effect, the
resulting overall impact remains ambiguous. The emer-
gence of this additional trading venue benefits some
traders, while harming others.
Expanding on this paper, Dönges and Heinemann (2001)
focus on some game theoretic refinements to reduce the
multiplicity of equilibria in the coordination game. In
particular, Dönges and Heinemann model intermarket
competition as a coordination game among traders and
investigate when a DM and a CN can coexist. If the disu-
tility from unexecuted orders sufficiently differs across
individuals, both markets coexist and order flow is frag-
mented. Market shares are determined by the distribution
of disutility.
B. Dynamic Model of CN-DM Interaction
In Degryse, Van Achter and Wuyts (2004), we investigate
the interaction of a CN and a continuous (one-tick) dealer
market (DM). More specifically, we analyze the impact on
the composition and dynamics of the order flow on both
systems. We contribute to previous work on CNs by
explicitly introducing dynamics into the analysis. These
dynamics are important: a typical characteristic of a CN
is that it “matches” orders at a specified time during the
trading day, while the existing primary market simultane-
ously operates in a continuous fashion. We develop the
analysis for three different informational settings: trans-
parency, complete opaqueness, and partial opaqueness.
The benchmark transparency case reflects that traders are
fully informed about past order flow and hence observe
the prevailing state of the CN’s order book8 before deter-
4. According to the literature, two conflicting effects arise. A potential benefit of increasing competition is that bid-ask spreads become narrower. Order flow
fragmentation, however, will cause bid-ask spreads to widen and moreover, may increase volatility.
5. For instance, DMs will cater more to traders demanding immediacy (i.e. informed traders with short-lived information, high-liquidity value traders,…) while CNs
will cater to those traders willing to sacrifice immediacy and certainty of execution in return for lower costs. Hence, when both compete, the CN is able to attract
both new low-liquidity-preference traders and liquidity traders that would otherwise go directly to the DM.
6. Inventory costs are reduced because the expected dealer imbalance is decreased due to long-lived information trading in the CN. Adverse selection risk and hence
costs in case of long-lived private information are now not only borne by dealers, but also partly by liquidity CN traders. Hence, the CN offers an additional venue
for fundamental, value-based trading.
7. Eventually, this also leads to a so-called critical-mass effect, implying that the CN must attract a sufficient trading volume, otherwise it is unable to attract any
order flow.
8. This CN order book contains all submitted orders. The assumptions on this book are contained in the discussion below. Note that a CN book differs from a limit
order book. In the latter, limit orders disappear when hit by a market order. In the CN, all orders remain in the book until the time of the cross.116 FINANCIEEL FORUM / BANK- EN FINANCIEWEZEN 2005/2 LARCIER
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mining their strategy. However, in reality CNs are rather
opaque. We incorporate this by analyzing two different
degrees of opaqueness: partial and complete. While
partial opaqueness implies that traders observe previous
trades at the DM but not submissions to the CN, complete
opaqueness entails that traders are uninformed on both
past CN and DM orders.
The general setup of our model is as follows. Traders are
assumed to arrive randomly and sequentially. Upon his
arrival, a trader knows whether he is a buyer or a seller,
observes the bid and ask price of the dealer, the state of the
CN’s order book (cf. infra), and his willingness to trade.
Moreover, he knows the time remaining to the cross, the
distribution of buyers and sellers and their willingness to
trade. Trading at the DM implies a one-tick spread.
Trading at the CN implies execution at the midprice,
derived from the DM (so CNs do not actively contribute
to price discovery). The cross takes place at the end of the
trading day. When both trading systems coexist, traders
can obtain guaranteed and immediate execution in the
DM. They can also opt for cheaper (since they save the
half spread), but later and (possibly) uncertain execution
on the CN. Order flow to the CN is gathered in an order
book where time priority is assumed. This is the case for
example in Xetra XXL, where first volume and then time
priority is imposed. The implication is that at the cross,
the orders submitted last at the excess market side do not
obtain execution. Execution is then only certain when,
upon arrival, a trader is able to join the shorter queue. In
all other cases, the execution probability is lower than
one. Finally, a trader can also refrain from trading. We
assume opportunistic CN trading to be very costly and
therefore exclude it as an equilibrium strategy. Investors
trade at most one unit.
We explicitly introduce dynamics into the analysis. In
particular, a trader’s decision hinges on the state of the
CN’s order book (when transparent) and his expectation
on the behavior of future traders determines his submis-
sion strategy. Important to note is that these strategies
depend on time; in other words, they are non-stationary.
The number of periods left until the time of the cross is
one important aspect. The crucial element in the choice
between a CN order and a DM trade, though, is the
execution probability at the CN, since this determines
expected profits. When an arriving trader submits a CN
order, she changes the imbalance in the CN. This affects
the execution probabilities of future CN orders and hence
also the strategies chosen by future traders. When deter-
mining his optimal strategy, he must take these effects of
his order into account.
Our findings can be summarized as follows. First, in
common to the three informational settings, we find that
an increase in the DM’s relative spread9 augments the
CN’s order flow. Therefore, we expect that CNs will be
more attractive in markets where spreads are substantial.
At the same time price discovery should be sufficiently
informative as the CN is “free riding” on price informa-
tion from the DM. Second, a CN and a DM cater to
different types of traders. Investors with a high willingness
to trade are more likely to opt for immediacy and trade at
a DM. The existence of a CN results in “order creation”:
investors with a low willingness to trade submit orders to
a CN whereas they would never trade at a DM. Third, we
also show that the execution probability at a CN is endog-
enous. The execution probability depends on the state of
the CN’s order book (if transparent), the observed order
flow, and the expectations regarding future orders. Hence,
although we start from dealers willing to provide liquidity
at exogenously given bid and ask prices, we partly endog-
enize liquidity supply and demand by looking at traders
submitting orders for potential execution at a CN. Fourth,
the transparency and partial opaqueness settings produce
systematic patterns in order flow. In particular, for the
transparency case, we find that the probability of
observing a CN order at the same side of the market is
smaller after such an order than if it was not. Also, the
probability of observing a sell at the DM decreases and
the probability of a buyer trading on the DM increases
when the previous order was a CN buy. Fifth, our results
highlight that it is important to take into account the
interaction between trading systems when measuring
“normal” order flow. For example, when looking sepa-
rately at an individual trading system, some trade flow
sequences could wrongly be interpreted as being driven by
information events. These sequences, however, could stem
from the interaction of trading systems.
III. Empirical Evidence on CNs
As for theoretical models, the empirical literature
analyzing CNs is also still in its infancy. The main reason
is that these proprietary systems often do not reveal
detailed information. In this section, we summarize the
results of five empirical studies we are aware of.
9. The relative spread is defined as the bid-ask spread divided by the midquote.LARCIER FORUM FINANCIER / REVUE BANCAIRE ET FINANCIÈRE 2005/2 117
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Gresse (2002) studies the impact of the POSIT CN on the
liquidity of the DM segment of the London Stock
Exchange (SEAQ) for two 6-months periods during 2001
for a cross-section of UK and Irish mid-cap stocks. She
finds that POSIT has a market share of total trading
volume in these stocks of about one to two percent. Its
probability of execution, though, is still low (2-4%).
Furthermore, she reports that activity at POSIT does not
have a detrimental effect on liquidity in the considered
DM: there is no significant increase in adverse selection or
inventory risk on the DM. Hence, empirically, no domi-
nating negative fragmentation effect is detected. Instead,
spreads decrease due to increased competition and to risk
sharing.
Conrad, Johnson and Wahal (2003) use proprietary data
for a total of $ 1.6 trillion in equity trades from 1996:1 to
1998:1 by 59 institutional investors in the US who are
able to choose between three trading platforms: CNs,
Electronic Communication Networks and traditional
brokers. They distinguish orders that are entirely filled by
one trading system (single-mechanism orders) and orders
that use more than one trading system (multiple-mecha-
nism orders). While controlling for variation in order and
security characteristics as well as for endogeneity in the
choice of trading venue, they find that crosses have
substantially lower realized execution costs as compared
to brokers (the average cost differential ranges from 14 to
30 basis points). Most of these economically significant
differences could be attributed to the lower commissions
on CNs, but also to the absence of a spread. However, the
cost differential is expected to decrease in the future, due
to additional competition. For the multiple-mechanism
orders, Conrad et al.  (2003) indeed find that most traders
opt for brokers as last method of execution (“market of
last resort” as in Hendershott and Mendelson (2000)).
Næs and Ødegaard (2004) examine the trades of the
Norwegian Petroleum Fund for a 6-month period: 4,200
orders that are sent first to CNs and, in case of non-execu-
tion, subsequently to brokers (i.e. an opportunistic
trading strategy). Their results show that although the
Conrad et al. (2003) cost differential is confirmed, it is not
clear that when accounting for the presence of private
information (which may affect the probability of crossing)
this cost differential persists10. Hence, lower trading costs
in CNs may be fully offset by costs of non-trading due to
adverse selection in the CNs.
Næs and Skjeltorp (2003) extend this analysis using the
same data set. They investigate the nature of competition
between a principal exchange and a CN with respect to
the primary market’s liquidity. Past empirical evidence
shows that CNs primarily compete in the most liquid
stocks. Næs ans Skjeltorp argue that if stocks that are not
supplied in CNs are less liquid in general, then these
stocks need a higher return to induce investors to hold
them. Consequently, the abnormal performance of the
non-crossed stocks found in Næs en Ødegaard (2004)
may be explained by a liquidity premium11. They find
significant differences in liquidity between stocks that are
on CNs and stocks that have to be bought in the market,.
This potentially indicates the presence of informed
trading in the non-executed CN stocks (cf. Næs en
Ødegaard). However, they also find that there are
systemic differences in liquidity between the two groups
of stocks on other dates than the trading dates of the
actual crossing strategy, suggesting that there are system-
atic differences in the characteristics of the two groups of
stocks that are unrelated to private information.
Finally, Fong, Madhavan and Swan (2004) focus on the
price impact of block trades on different trading venues,
i.e. a limit order book, a CN and an upstairs market for
data from the Australian Stock Exchange. They find that
competition from the two latter markets imposes no
adverse effect on the liquidity of the limit order book.
Hence, there is no evidence of a liquidity drain from the
downstairs market. Moreover, they argue that the migra-
tion of trades to the upstairs market is not responsible for
the high asymmetric information problems in downstairs
markets. As compared to Gresse (2002), they argue that
this benefit is caused by an improvement of counterparty
search, rather than by the cream-skimming of informed
traders or by the risk-sharing explanations.
IV. Concluding Remarks
Recently, a number of crossing networks (CNs) have
become active in securities trading. Examples are Instinet
Crossing Network, POSIT, E-Crossnet, or Xetra XXL.
Investors face a number of tradeoffs when considering a
CN relative to existing primary markets. On the one
hand, CNs minimize price impact, allow for saving the
half-spread, have lower submission and execution costs
and offer completely anonymous trading. On the other
10. Note that standard methods of measuring trading costs do not account for this adverse selection component.
11. Note that the liquidity and the information story need not be mutually exclusive.118 FINANCIEEL FORUM / BANK- EN FINANCIEWEZEN 2005/2 LARCIER
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hand, they offer low execution probabilities and no imme-
diacy. Non-execution of an order at the CN implies that
the investor needs to relay his order to an existing primary
financial market. This opportunistic CN trading intro-
duces some risks as the market may move against the
investor, or spreads on financial markets may have
widened. Furthermore, CN trades are executed at prices
that are derived from an existing primary market. This
“parasite pricing” requires a sufficiently informative and
well-functioning existing primary market.
CNs also have an impact on other financial markets. Two
opposite forces appear. First, CNs introduce additional
risk sharing benefits as liquidity providers’ inventory and
adverse selection costs are lowered by exclusive CN
traders. This force leads to lower spreads. Second, spreads
may widen due to opportunistic CN trading, where the
existing primary market is being used as “market of last
resort”. In this case, the CN is skimming off part of the
uninformed traders.
The existing empirical evidence reveals that, although
CNs offer lower trading costs, trading volumes and execu-
tion probabilities are rather low. This raises several open
issues. Is this evidence valid for all stocks and all CNs?
Should traditional markets integrate a crossing facility
into their trading venues? Should CNs become more
transparent in order to increase execution probabilities
and attract more order flow? These are issues for further
research.
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